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Chapter 3
The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought 
of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II, 
with Emphasis on His Indebtedness to Max Scheler
Peter J. Colosi
In a way, his [Pope John Paul II’s] undisputed contribution to 
Christian thought can be understood as a profound meditation 
on the person. He enriched and expanded the concept in 
his encyclicals and other writings. These texts represent a 
patrimony to be received, collected and assimilated with 
care.1            - Pope Benedict XVI
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout the writings of Karol Wojtyła, both before and after 
he became Pope John Paul II, one finds expressions of gratitude and 
indebtedness to the philosopher Max Scheler. It is also well known that in his 
Habilitationsschrift,2 Wojtyła concluded that Max Scheler’s ethical system 
cannot cohere with Christian ethics. This state of affairs gives rise to the 
question: which of the ideas of Scheler did Wojtyła embrace and which did he 
reject? And also, what was Wojtyła’s overall attitude towards and assessment 
of Scheler?
 A look through all the works of Wojtyła reveals numerous expressions 
of gratitude to Scheler for philosophical insights which Wojtyła embraced 
and built upon, among them this explanation of his sources for The Acting 
Person,
Granted the author’s acquaintance with traditional 
Aristotelian thought, it is however the work of Max Scheler 
that has been a major influence upon his reflection. In my 
overall conception of the person envisaged through the 
mechanisms of his operative systems and their variations, as 
presented here, may indeed be seen the Schelerian foundation 
studied in my previous work.3
I have listed many further examples in the appendix to this paper. 
It must, however, also be clearly stated that there are ideas in Scheler which 
Wojtyła rejected as false, for example, Scheler’s thesis that moral obligation 
dissolves when a person reaches the heights of love.4
In general, after looking through the texts where Wojtyła mentions 
Scheler or has clearly absorbed and/or developed his thought, it becomes 
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clear that his overall attitude is one of respect for a master from whom he 
learned much. And this fact is not contradicted by noting that he also rejected 
forcefully certain errors he perceived in Scheler’s thought. A thorough 
cataloguing of the Schelerian theses embraced by Wojtyła would be a helpful 
addition to scholarship on both authors. I have indicated some directions in 
which that work could proceed in my appendix, and some readers may wish 
to look there first.
My main goal here, however, will be to focus on one single theme 
in Scheler that Wojtyła embraced. That theme is the uniqueness of persons. 
I will begin by first pointing to a distinction between two dimensions of the 
being of persons which are the sources of their worth: their rational nature and 
their uniqueness. Then I will cite some texts of Wojtyła in which it becomes 
clear that he embraced the idea of the uniqueness of persons. My idea is 
not that Wojtyła wrote an explicit philosophical development of Scheler’s 
individual value essence. Rather, I mean to show that Scheler’s development 
of individual persons and love between persons so impressed itself on Wojtyła 
that it is expressed in striking ways in many of his writings and also when he 
describes his encounters with people.5
I base this conclusion on two premises. The first is the idea that 
personal uniqueness is a real dimension of personal being and a deep source 
of the dignity of persons, and thus a dimension of which a man whose life was 
spent meeting and serving people would have been keenly aware. Though 
often neglected in philosophy, two authors have developed this dimension in 
philosophically original ways: Max Scheler and John F. Crosby. One of my 
goals will be to express this aspect of persons. I will then point out that Wojtyła 
reveals a profound awareness of personal uniqueness in his pastoral and 
theological writings and in some metaphysical assertions in his philosophical 
texts, even if it was not a primary theme. My second premise is that if one 
author deeply absorbs another, this influence is lasting and can be detected in 
many ways. In Scheler’s thought the uniqueness of persons is a primary theme 
(though, as I shall show, he uses different terminology for “uniqueness”), and 
Wojtyła did deeply absorb Scheler’s thought. George Weigel has provided 
insightful and thorough historical evidence of the lasting influence of Scheler 
on Wojtyła.6 After discussing these premises, I will proceed to confront a 
Thomistic-based objection that was raised when I presented this paper. To 
conclude I will present an application to foundational ethical questions in the 
sphere of current debates in health care and bio-ethics. This last section will 
entail a consideration of the role of the affective sphere in gaining ethical 
knowledge, and suggest a Schelerian/Wojtyłian contribution to this field of 
contemporary ethical debate.
RATIONAL NATURE AS A SOURCE OF THE WORTH OF 
PERSONS
 Much of Western philosophy elevates human beings above all other 
entities that inhabit the earth. This lofty worth is presented as the foundation 
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of moral laws that forbid the violation of human beings, such as using them in 
various ways as if they were mere means to some end. Western philosophy has 
maintained that the metaphysical basis for this superior worth which grounds 
those laws is the rational nature of human beings: any being possessing a 
rational nature is deemed to be worthy of absolute respect. The exact nature of 
the rationality possessed by humans differs somewhat among the philosophers 
who have defended it, but perhaps a few key features could be identified. 
A rational nature includes the ability to transcend oneself in such a way as 
to relate meaningfully to the whole world; we perform these acts of self-
transcendence through our intellect, will, and affections. Thus, of the beings 
on earth, only fellow humans can follow a lecture, make judgments about it 
and ask questions after it. Only humans participate in the moral life by bringing 
into being actions and states of soul that can be called morally good or evil,7 
and only human beings can be moved and then respond with the deepest of 
emotions to, for example, beautiful works of art and nature. Animals cannot 
engage in discussion, they cannot be said to be morally virtuous or vicious 
and they do not have an aesthetic perception of the beauty of a sunset. Any 
being with these capabilities reveals itself to possess a rational nature, and is 
thus deemed to hold a higher rank than beings which lack these capabilities.8
 Another dimension of this account of the worth of persons that runs 
through the Western tradition is based on the Aristotelian distinctions of 
substance/accident and potency/act. Based on these distinctions is the view 
that a human being in a state of dreamless sleep retains in actual being its 
immaterial soul, along with its intellectual, volitional and affective faculties, 
while retaining consciousness in potency only. Not only does this line of 
thought maintain that humans in dreamless sleep still have their souls, but so 
do other living humans in various states of diminished/non-consciousness.9
 I think that Western philosophy is correct in its assertion that such a 
rational nature raises the worth of a being to a level that grounds exceptionless 
moral norms to respect that being,10 and that Western philosophy has produced 
an accurate philosophical account of many features of that rational nature.
WOJTYŁA’S INDEBTEDNESS TO SCHELER’S PERSONALISM
ABOVE ALL OTHER FORMS OF PERSONALISM
 In the texts in the appendix, and in ones that will follow shortly, when 
Wojtyła speaks of his indebtedness to personalism, he either mentions only 
Scheler by name, or gives a list of names and always puts Scheler’s first. 
One might then be led to think that Wojtyła was drawn to some philosophical 
insights in Scheler which were not present in the other personalists. Indeed, 
there is more than one such idea, and the individuality of persons (what I am 
calling their “uniqueness”) is certainly a significant one. John Crosby has 
recently shown that none of the personalists who write about individuality 
mean by it what Scheler meant:
Scheler does not posit the antithesis of “person” and 
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“individual” that is found in many personalist authors, 
such as Maritain, Mournier, and (even if he is not usually 
reckoned to the personalists) Hans Urs von Balthasar. 
Maritain lets “individual” express the material extensive 
aspect of man, with the result that “person” expresses the 
spiritual aspect of man.11 Mounier lets “individual” express 
a meaning more distinctly moral, namely the grasping, 
acquisitive, self-assertive side of man, with the result that 
“person” expresses the generous self-giving side of man.12 
Von Balthasar lets “individual” express man as an instance 
of human nature, with the result that “person” expresses 
man as incommunicable, unrepeatable.13 But in each case 
“individual” forms some kind of antithesis to “person” and 
it expresses something lower in human beings, something in 
contrast to what is highest and best in them, which receives 
the designation “person.” Now, as usual as this antithesis 
is among personalist authors, Scheler knows nothing of it: 
individuality for him is nothing but an aspect of personhood. 
When he entitles a section of his Formalismus “Person und 
Individuum,” he means to suggest no least antithesis; on the 
contrary, “Individuum” expresses for him the very heart of 
“Person.”14
 Three questions arise from this reading. What exactly does it mean 
to assert that individuum is the very heart of person? Exactly how does one 
express the meaning of this view as distinct from all other personalists? Can 
it be seen from his writings that Wojtyła picked up on and embraced exactly 
this Schelerian understanding of personal individuality?
THE UNIQUENESS OF PERSONS15
I devote my very rare free moments to a work that is close to 
my heart and devoted to the metaphysical sense and mystery 
of the person. It seems to me that the debate today is being 
played on that level. The evil of our times consists in the first 
place in a kind of degradation, indeed a pulverization, of the 
fundamental uniqueness of each human person. This evil is 
even much more of the metaphysical order than of the moral 
order. To this disintegration, planned at times by atheistic 
ideologies, we must oppose, rather than sterile polemics, 
a kind of “recapitulation” of the inviolable mystery of the 
person. I firmly believe that the truths attacked compel with 
more urgency the recognition of those who are often the 
involuntary victims of it…16
This text of Wojtyła reveals his absorption of the idea of individual 
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persons from Scheler, and I will draw on it throughout the discussion which 
follows.
I would like to begin to answer the questions posed at the end of 
the last section by presenting a simple two-part definition of philosophy. 
The first part of philosophy consists in getting a good look at reality, a clear 
perception of some dimension of reality. Once that is achieved, the second 
part of philosophy consists in formulating assertions that accurately express 
that dimension of reality which one has clearly seen. This is what philosophers 
are supposed to do.
 Following this schema, our first approach to the uniqueness of persons 
will be to notice, as Scheler does, that while this quality can be seen clearly, 
it is impossible to perform the second part of philosophy on it. That is to say, 
while one can see and know the uniqueness of another person, there are no 
words that can be spoken which would capture or express that uniqueness.17 
Since I have just asserted that no words can express the uniqueness which 
is the main topic of my paper, you may be wondering how I will be able to 
continue; I am writing words, yet I just said that words cannot express that 
about which I intend to write.
 I will begin, then, by pointing out exactly what this uniqueness is not. 
I can express using words that outline what the uniqueness is not, and then, by 
negating the definition thus outlined, lead the reader to see what uniqueness 
actually is. The uniqueness of persons is often designated by referring to 
it as their “incommunicability.” For the purposes of this paper the terms 
“uniqueness” and “incommunicability” may be considered interchangeable. 
Notice that ‘in-communicable’ is itself a word that points to something by 
negating its opposite.18 It functions in the same way that im-mortal does. For 
whatever reason, we have taken to pointing to “that intensity of life which 
is so strong that it can never be extinguished” by using a term that literally 
means “not-dead,” or “not able to be dead.” Incommunicability points to a 
certain profound dimension of being, uniqueness, with a word that simply 
means “not-common.” And indeed, Scheler’s definition of the individual value 
essence of a person is expressly set by him against the notion of a universal 
essence which is common in the sense that it can be instantiated in more than 
one exemplar:
it is necessary to give a more precise definition of what 
we understand by individual-personal value essence…. 
Essence, as we mentioned earlier, has nothing to do with 
universality…there are essences that are given only in one 
particular individual. And for this very reason it makes 
good sense to speak of an individual essence and also the 
individual value-essence of a person.19
It must be noted that the word “incommunicable” looks as though it 
could mean “unable to be communicated,” however, the incommunicable in 
persons is that in them which actually makes possible the deepest and most 
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meaningful forms of communication.20 For this reason, the choice of the term 
“incommunicable” could be seen as an unfortunate choice, since it leads 
so easily to such confusion. Therefore, I would like to give three possible 
meanings of the term and assert that two of the meanings of “incommunicable” 
are helpful in bringing us to an awareness of the uniqueness of persons, while 
the third leads to error:
Meaning 1: The incommunicable is that within a person which is not 
common, in the sense that other persons could not have this within 
their being also. I have a will and an intellect, and so do you, therefore 
those features are common. But you are unique in your person, and 
unrepeatable, in a way that no one else can ever be you. This meaning of 
incommunicable is helpful in understanding personal uniqueness because 
it gets at the idea of “not-common.”
Meaning 2: The incommunicable in persons cannot be expressed in 
words and sentences. While someone who loves you is able to grasp, 
know and love you in your very uniqueness, they could never utter a 
sentence which would capture or express that uniqueness. This meaning 
of incommunicable is also helpful in understanding personal uniqueness, 
because it gets at a narrow sense of “not able to be communicated,” 
namely, with words.
Meaning : The incommunicable is that which is unable to be known by 
anyone else or communicated to anyone else. This meaning leads straight 
to error. The mere fact that no words can express the uniqueness of a 
person whom you love in no way implies that you do not know and love 
their very uniqueness – it only means that that which you know and love 
in them is ineffable or unutterable. It would be absurd to conclude that just 
because words cannot be found to express something you know, that you 
therefore do not know it. This meaning leads to error because it takes the 
full and broadest meaning of “communication” and negates its possibility 
at all in interpersonal relating with respect to personal uniqueness.21
As I have already suggested, love is the epistemological vehicle through 
which we know the uniqueness of others. In the realist phenomenology of 
Scheler and others, it was thematized that depending on the object known, a 
different faculty was needed. Thus, for colors, one needed the faculty of sight; 
for sounds, hearing; for mathematical principles, the intellect; and for values, 
Scheler would say, feelings.22 This means that Scheler holds the view that love 
has a cognitive dimension. Normally one conceives of love as a fullness of 
feeling welling up in the soul of a lover which is then expressed outwardly as 
a response to the beloved. While this is a correct characterization, love seems 
also to have a receptive dimension, in which knowledge comes to a person 
and deepens because of love. One normally thinks of the intellect as the 
faculty whose primary function it is to cognize reality.23 Not only the intellect, 
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however, but also the heart, or the feelings, have a cognitive dimension.24 And 
it is only through loving another person that his or her uniqueness is known 
or encountered by us. Joshua Miller describes this particular form of affective 
cognition in the following way:
In the first place, coming to know the unique person is at 
the same time a gaining of insight into her individual value 
essence. This essence comes to us as a distinct feeling in the 
heart; the person impresses herself on our heart in a way that 
no one else does. It also often comes to us in our imagination; 
we literally picture the person, especially her face, as a kind 
of incarnation of this individual value essence.25
THE DIFFICULTY OF GRASPING PERSONAL UNIQUENESS AS A 
SOURCE OF A PERSON’S WORTH 
In an insightful essay26 offered shortly after the death of John Paul II, 
George Weigel cites the line in the letter to de Lubac about the pulverization 
of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person, and lists the horrors of 
the 20th century, many of which Wojtyła himself experienced or witnessed, as 
the grim realization of this pulverization. Yet, in the next paragraph Weigel 
misses the point of the line he quoted by passing right over the notion of 
“fundamental uniqueness”:
Wojtyła’s counter-proposal was…built on the conviction that 
God had made the human creature in His image and likeness, 
with intelligence and freewill, a creature capable of knowing 
the good and freely choosing it. That, John Paul insisted in 
a vast number of variations on one great theme, was the true 
measure of man – the human capacity, in cooperation with 
God’s grace, for heroic virtue.
 I would first of all whole-heartedly agree that all of these features 
raise the worth of human persons to the level which grounds absolute respect. 
But none of the items named by Weigel seem to capture Wojtyła’s meaning 
with the term “fundamental uniqueness.” It is as if Weigel thinks that Wojtyła 
intends “unique” to refer to our entire species as unique over all other species 
of created things, because everyone in our unique species can do these acts, 
while animals, plants and rocks cannot. But Wojtyła referred to the fundamental 
uniqueness of each person, i.e., from every other person within our species. 
And the features as such listed by Weigel are not the person, nor exactly that 
which we love in another. When a loved one dies, we do not mourn that an 
intellect or a free will is gone, which all other people have too, but that this 
unrepeatable person is gone. Crosby expresses it thus:  
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The loss of any person would not be a negligible loss on 
the grounds that so many persons remain, but would be an 
almost infinitely great loss, as if the only person in existence 
had been lost.27
This is why people who have lost a loved one are in a sense inconsolable 
for the rest of their lives. Of course we miss the intellect, will and laugh of 
this very person, and the reason for that is because these common features 
(intellect, will, risibility) of persons “appear in their full individuality…on 
the basis of being rooted in the person. We can say that it is this person who 
in a certain sense communicates full individuality to the qualities.”28 A laugh 
is unique because it is “informed” by the unique person who is laughing. And 
Scheler says that
[t]he love which has moral value is not that which pays 
loving regard to a person for having such and such qualities, 
pursuing such and such activities, or for possessing talents, 
beauty, or virtue; it is that love which incorporates these 
qualities, activities and gifts into its object, because they 
belong to that individual person.29
Wojtyła, it seems to me, has in mind this dimension of persons in 
his letter to Henri de Lubac, not the common features of our human personal 
nature.30
UNDERSTANDING PERSONAL UNIQUENESS BY EXAMINING A 
THOMISTIC-BASED OBJECTION31
 After this paper was presented, two conference participants expressed 
an objection which I understood in the following way. They approved of the 
discussion of the uniqueness of persons, even in the way I presented it, but 
they insisted that I refer to that dimension of personal being as the esse of 
persons, and that I not refer to it as the essence of a person (Scheler, as already 
noted, calls it the “individual value essence”). They seemed to maintain the 
view that essence is always common and that existence is the sole source of 
uniqueness and individuality.
 Introducing a collection of texts of St. Thomas on metaphysics, 
W. Norris Clark, S.J. encapsulates what I take to be the core Thomistic 
metaphysical assertion concerning esse represented in their objection:
“A being,” (used without qualification) means for him that 
which is, in the real order. The that which signifies what a 
thing is, its essence or nature, responding to the question, 
“What is it?” The is signifies the act of existing, or active 
presence, which posits the what in the real order…responding 
to the question, “Is it?”, or “Does it exist?”…This inner act 
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of existence – which St. Thomas calls the esse or “to-be” of 
a being, that which makes a being precisely to be a be-ing – 
is not a what, an essence or nature, making a being to be this 
kind of being. It is, rather, an active presence which posits 
the entire essence, with all its properties, in the real order of 
actual existence, making it actually to be what it is.32
I do not disagree with this account of esse, and if one considers the 
case of multiple objects of the same type that seem identical in every way, 
then I would agree with the assertion that the esse of such beings also fully 
accounts for the uniqueness of those beings. Consider multiple schoolroom 
desk chairs, for example, all lined up next to each other in rows. They share 
everything in common besides their own instantiation; that is, all the chairs 
are stamped with the same general essence of chairness (simply put, each is 
stamped with the blueprint for that model of chair), but each chair actualizes 
that essence separately. Each chair has its own unique existence (esse). In this 
case it is true to say that the source of uniqueness is the esse of each chair 
which is making it be this real chair and not any of the other chairs.33 And 
while the essence or “plan/blueprint” for the chairs which is really present in 
each of them is “unique” in the sense that it is in that one there as concretely 
instantiated and in this other one here,34 ultimately we would not rightly insist 
on unique essences in the full sense, since they all look identical.35
But notice that the bearer of the “worth”36 of a chair is not its 
uniqueness, but rather that about it which makes it the same as all the other 
chairs, namely its essence. Of course I mean the really existing essence of 
the chair which has “an active presence which posits the entire essence,” as 
Fr. Clark put it. However, the focal point of our interest is primarily those 
essential features of the real chair, and this can be shown by asking what we 
do with a broken chair? Toss it in the garbage and take one that works, despite 
its uniqueness as being this chair and no other. Why? Because the focal point 
of the “worth” of the chair is not what is unique about that chair, but rather 
what is common, its chairness.
Consider another question about a schoolroom chair.37 If I want to 
sit and can see only one chair in the room, then that chair has a great deal of 
importance for me. If, however, upon entering the room I see 700 such chairs, 
then suddenly the particular one diminishes greatly from the point of view 
of “worth.” Beings whose “worth” comes primarily from their common traits 
are relativized in that worth when placed next to many more exemplars of the 
same type. While having esse is necessary if a person wants actually to sit 
in a chair, that is as far as it goes, and any existing chair will have the same 
“worth” in fulfilling that function.
But consider a person, and it is best to consider one whom you love 
dearly. If you place that person next to 700 or seven million other people, 
their worth does not drop to an insignificant level, like a chair next to 700 
other chairs. It does not drop at all. Now someone may object in the following 
way, “ah, but the reason it does not drop is because you asked me to think of 
70               Peter J. Colosi
a person I love, and their worth doesn’t seem to drop to me because I love 
them.” I would agree in one sense and strongly disagree in another. If it is 
meant that your love for that person is the complete source of their worth 
such that if you did not love them, then they would be worthless, then I would 
strongly disagree.38 If, on the other hand, it is only meant that since you love 
this person you have a better insight into their worth than people who do not 
love them, but that their worth is inside them regardless of your love, then I 
would agree. 
Your love makes you see that their worth is not relativized by 
numerous instantiations of human nature put next to them. The reason for 
this is that the focal point of another person’s worth, unlike the chairs, is 
their uniqueness. Love is inspired by catching a glimpse of the uniqueness of 
another person, and once so inspired, in turn allows for a deeper and clearer 
vision of that person’s uniqueness, which in turn inspires more love, and so 
on. But your love for them is not the foundational metaphysical cause of their 
uniqueness, it just gives you a clear vision of their uniqueness. Once you see 
it, then you also see that it is not diminished in its worth and preciousness 
when that person is standing next to seven million other people. Chairs, on 
the other hand, are so diminished. The deepest source of the “worth” of a 
chair is precisely what it has exactly in common with all the other chairs, 
while the deepest source of worth in a person is precisely what he or she does 
not have in common with anyone else. For this reason all statements such as 
“what is so important about uniqueness, every stone is unique?” utterly miss 
the mark.39 The difference between unique persons and unique stones is so 
radical that I would almost hesitate to use the term “analogy” to describe the 
similarity.40
Another way to get the same idea across is to ask why it is that you 
love this person. The answer is not a common trait. You do not love a person 
because they have the faculty of intellect, or will, or because they have five 
senses. After making a new friend or falling in love, no one exclaims: “Guess 
what?! I met another functioning intellect today! I met another being with 
a free will!” Rather, one says, “I met a new person today!” Of course, a 
person expresses himself or herself to you through an intellect and a free 
will, but the person is not reducible to those faculties,41 nor to those faculties 
actualized through esse. There is something utterly unique about each person, 
which is indeed expressed through traits that are common to all persons and 
intimately united with those traits, but which is not accounted for by listing 
those traits. This dimension of the person is individual in its very content, and 
therefore cannot be duplicated in another person. It is in the strictest sense 
unique. It is this unrepeatable, utterly unique, essential content of a person 
that Crosby refers to with the term “incommunicable,” and Scheler refers to 
as the individual value essence. Pope John Paul II was also clearly referring 
to this uniqueness when he made the following statement wherein he credited 
his awareness of uniqueness to his study of personalism (and we know that 
the personalist he studied above all others is Max Scheler):
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It is difficult to formulate a systematic theory on how to 
relate to people, yet I was greatly helped in this by the study 
of personalism during the years I devoted to philosophy. 
Every human being is an individual person and therefore I 
cannot program a priori a certain type of relationship that 
could be applied to everyone, but I must, so to speak, learn it 
anew in every case…It is very important for a bishop to have 
a rapport with his people and to know how to relate to them 
well. In my own case, significantly, I never felt that I was 
meeting an excessive number of people. Nonetheless, I was 
always concerned to safeguard the personal quality of each 
relationship. Every person is a chapter to himself. I always 
acted with this conviction, but I realize that it is something 
you can’t learn. It is simply there, because it comes from 
within.42
The Pope did not say here that we need to focus on the rational nature 
of each person we meet, nor did he say we ought to look with awe to their act 
of being which gives that nature reality - of course, we should do these things 
too - but that is not the import of this quote. Notice that he even utilizes the 
Schelerian language of “individual person.” And the last line reminds one of 
the ineffable uniqueness of each person: why couldn’t you “learn about” a 
will, or a will actualized through esse? The point is, you can learn about those, 
and even form a systematic theory about them, which has been done. But he 
says here that you cannot do that with persons. 
 We see that Scheler’s phrase “individual person” (noted in the text 
of Scheler quoted above43) was taken over here by John Paul. In both texts 
there is the idea that love is not properly directed at what is common, but at 
what is unique, which is the individual person. This idea is exactly that which 
makes Scheler so very different from all other personalists: individuum, as 
Crosby rightly pointed out, is the very heart of personhood, and John Paul 
II uses language which reveals his absorption of this Schelerian insight here. 
The quote above indicates that this was the guiding focus in his meetings with 
people.44
There are more texts which confirm this very same Schelerian 
influence on Wojtyła’s approach to persons. Consider the following quote, 
especially its last two sentences:
…after my priestly ordination I was sent to Rome to complete 
my studies…These studies resulted in my doctorate on Saint 
John of the Cross and then the dissertation on Max Scheler 
which qualified me for University teaching: specifically I 
wrote on the contribution which Scheler’s phenomenological 
type of ethical system can make to the development of moral 
theology. This research benefited me greatly. My previous 
Aristotelian-Thomistic formation was enriched by the 
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phenomenological method, and this made it possible for me 
to undertake a number of creative studies. I am thinking above 
all of my book The Acting Person. In this way I took part in 
the contemporary movement of philosophical personalism, 
and my studies were able to bear fruit in my pastoral work. I 
have often noticed how many of the ideas developed in these 
studies have helped me in my meetings with individuals and 
with great numbers of the faithful during my apostolic visits. 
My formation within the cultural horizon of personalism 
also gave me a deeper awareness of how each individual is a 
unique person. I think that this awareness is very important 
for every priest.45
And consider this striking text as well:
If we celebrate so solemnly the birth of Jesus, we do it so as to 
bear witness to the fact that each person is someone, unique 
and unrepeatable. If humanity’s statistics and arrangement, 
its political, economic and social systems as well as its 
simple possibilities, do not come about to assure man that 
he can be born, exist and work as a unique and unrepeatable 
individual, then bid ‘farewell’ to all assurances. For Christ 
and because of Him, the individual is always unique and 
unrepeatable; someone eternally conceived and eternally 
chosen; someone called and given a special name.46
John Paul II speaks here of a unique and unrepeatable someone 
eternally conceived, chosen, called and named. He does not speak of a 
human nature given inner actuality and nothing more. He speaks of a unique 
individual given inner actuality.47
THE UNIQUENESS OF PERSONS AS INTRINSIC – THEOLOGICAL 
TEXTS OF JOHN PAUL II
Considering together the Pope’s Christmas reflections on the unique 
individuality of each person and his earlier letter to de Lubac stating that the 
evil of the pulverization of the fundamental uniqueness of each person is much 
more of the metaphysical than of the moral order, a call emerges to understand 
and to “recapitulate” the metaphysical status of this uniqueness. Let us, then, 
without discounting its mystery, attempt to probe it more deeply.
An all-powerful God could make all the skin cells and body cells of 
two people to be identical, and could make all of their experiences the same. 
Even if God did that, Scheler would still say that these two people are in the 
core of their being different one from the other. He would say this because 
external factors are not the primary reason for the differences between, or 
The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyła              
the uniqueness of, persons (although they do participate in our uniqueness in 
various ways). Scheler comments:
Supposing we could get rid of all physical differences between 
human beings (including their essential here-and-nowness), 
and could further eliminate all qualitative differences in 
regard to their private objects of consciousness (including 
the formal aspect of these objects – in short the whole of 
what they think, will, feel, etc.), the individual diversity of 
their central personalities would still remain, despite the fact 
that the idea of personality would be the same in each of 
them.48
I would like to proceed by considering some theological texts of 
Pope John Paul II in which one detects the Schelerian understanding of 
the uniqueness of persons. It will be helpful first to consider the following 
formulation of personal uniqueness by Crosby, which expresses both that 
it is intrinsic to persons and that it is a really existing, one-time essential 
structure:
…it does not suffice to point to the unrepeatability of the 
genetic make up of a human being, that is, of those traits of 
race, temperament, intelligence, etc., which depend on the 
genetic make-up of an individual. These traits are indeed 
woven together in a given individual in a way that is not 
repeated by other individuals, but this is only a relative 
unrepeatability. There is after all no absurdity in exactly 
these traits being repeated in exactly these interconnections 
in a second and third individual – indeed this repeating is 
exactly what happens in the case of identical twins.49 But 
there is an absurdity in there being two copies of one and the 
same person. The incommunicability that we found above in 
a certain existential form, and into which we now inquire in 
asking about a possible essential form of it, lies at a deeper 
level in a human being. It lies in the depths of personal being; 
it is not a relative but an absolute incommunicability…Each 
person has an essential something that only he or she can 
have, or rather can be, an essential something that would 
forever be lost to the world, leaving a kind of irreparable 
metaphysical hole in it, if the person embodying it would go 
out of existence altogether.50
 In theological terms, Crosby would seem to be implying here that in 
creating a new person, God is thinking of, and bringing into being, a specific 
someone, and not merely giving inner actuality to the form of human nature. 
Referring again to the Thomistic-based objection analyzed earlier, if someone 
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held the view that the moment of coming into being of a new human person 
could be fully accounted for by saying that inner actuality was given to the 
form of human nature, then one would be committed to the position that the 
source of the uniqueness we encounter in people was entirely extrinsic to that 
person. This would mean that as experiences started happening to this new 
human, those experiences would begin to shape that person’s personality, and 
since it is statistically practically impossible that the exact same experiences 
happen to two people, we end up with the uniqueness we encounter in others. 
Such a view would deny that at the moment of the creation of a new human 
person God also put the person’s uniqueness there, making it intrinsic to that 
person. But Scheler, as was demonstrated, does not agree with the idea that 
the exclusive source of the uniqueness of persons is extrinsic to them. He 
thinks there is a divinely determined uniqueness within each of us, as Joshua 
Miller has shown.51 In fact, Miller’s analysis reveals that there are two sources 
of the uniqueness of persons for Scheler. While it is the divinely determined 
one that can be perceived in the texts of John Paul II that I will provide and 
analyze in a moment, I would like to give Miller’s summary of both sources.
A key part of Scheler’s personalism is the idea that each 
person has an individual value essence, which he sometimes 
calls an ideal essence or ideal value image that permeates 
the person’s being. This individual value essence is 
determined by God and indicates an abiding ontological 
structure of personal uniqueness. A second dimension of 
personal uniqueness…emerges from the person’s nature as 
self-determining. Because the person is spiritual, like God, 
he is spontaneous, creative, and above all free so that each of 
his acts is something new and distinct in the world. I will not 
argue that a person can change his essence or operate outside 
its parameters, but I do mean to say that uniqueness is, in 
part, something indeterminate and fluid. The person, who is 
essentially unique, is also free and therefore can authentically 
actualize his individual value essence in a number of ways. 
In doing so he does not simply concretize what Scheler calls 
an ideal value image that God has of him. Rather, he co-
creates this image; he self-determinatively fills in the lines 
that have been established for him.52
 In The Gospel of Life, paragraphs 44 and 68, John Paul II lists 
numerous lyrical scripture passages which point to God’s love for babies in 
the womb. He then asks a profound rhetorical question: “How can anyone 
think that even a single moment of this marvelous process of the unfolding of 
life could be separated from the wise and loving work of the Creator, and left 
prey to human caprice?”53 But wouldn’t it be the case that if the uniqueness 
of persons was constituted exclusively by events that happen to us, many of 
which are quite random, then this would be precisely that caprice which a 
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loving Creator would not choose as the ultimate source of our unique person? 
And he adds:
Human life is sacred and inviolable at every moment of 
existence, including the initial phase which precedes birth. 
All human beings, from their mothers’ womb, belong to God 
who searches them and knows them, who forms them and 
knits them together with his own hands, who gazes on them 
when they are tiny shapeless embryos and already sees in 
them the adults of tomorrow whose days are numbered…
There too, when they are still in their mothers’ womb – as 
many passages of the Bible bear witness – they are the 
personal objects of God’s loving and fatherly providence.54
 Do these texts not engender an image of a specific someone who, 
from the beginning, is present with an inner actuality not only of their human 
nature, but also of their very uniqueness in some way, and already loved by 
God as that person, as opposed to an instantiated human nature that will only 
later become unique due to external influences? 
 As was seen above, Scheler expressly rejected the notion that external 
factors such as the unique space that I occupy, time and experiences that happen 
to me, or acts that I perform could exhaustively account for my uniqueness. 
He argues instead, as Crosby has shown, for a radically intrinsic principle of 
uniqueness, finding a “particular strength of individuality in human persons, 
which he explains by saying that each person has an essence all his own, that 
is, an essence that could not be possibly repeated in a second person.”55
Crosby cites an interesting quote, where Richard Stith says, “Even 
if God were to promise me that he would immediately substitute an identical 
person…for my wife if I would let him take her away, I would refuse. I do 
not want someone like her, I want her.”56 Crosby uses this quote to criticize 
a remark that Stith makes a few pages later. He says that Stith is forced into 
referring to the dimension of his wife that he wants as her existence only 
because he has not yet conceived that some essences are not universal, such as 
the unique, ineffable, essential something of his wife that will never be again 
in any other person. I would like to extend the use of the Stith quote and ask: 
would not God, who also loves each of us, also have that same intensity of 
love expressed by Stith for his wife toward each of us from the first moment 
of our existence? It would be opposed to the principles of divine love and 
beauty for God not to be able to say from the very beginning to each one 
of us that we are not just repeatable instantiations of human rational nature; 
what kind of love would that be? This idea is contained within the core of the 
quotes from The Gospel of Life that I have given, and it was developed by 
Scheler in an unexpected way with unexpected clarity. Perhaps it impressed 
itself on the mind and heart of Wojtyła in the years he dedicated to poring 
over Scheler’s work.
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It seems that Scheler’s position could not countenance the view that in 
God’s creation of a human person God only took some amount of raw esse and 
gave it human nature.57 For Scheler maintains, as Miller has shown, that there 
are two sources of our uniqueness, and one of them is divinely determined. 
And so, according to this account it would follow that God brings into being 
a human nature and also an individual person by giving the unity of these 
two an inner actuality, or esse. And while human nature can be instantiated 
more than once in billions of human persons, your unique “youness,” i.e., that 
which your mother sees and loves in you, is not able to be instantiated like 
that, since it only comes once.
 Crosby provides one further helpful distinction for us here: the 
distinction between the existential incommunicability and the essential 
incommunicability of persons.58 He suggests the possibility that the dignity 
of persons belongs more to existential incommunicability, while the personal 
lovableness, on the other hand, belongs more to essential (but, of course, 
really existing) incommunicability.59
There is the dignity of each person in virtue of which we 
owe respect to persons; but then there is the goodness or 
lovableness of a person which, once seen and experienced, 
awakens something like friendship, or perhaps a spousal 
love, for that person. This lovableness is perhaps even more 
deeply rooted in the incommunicable selfhood of each person 
than the dignity of the person, because every person has this 
dignity, whereas the lovableness of a person is possessed 
only by that person and by no other. I am capable of 
recognizing the dignity of every person whom I meet and of 
showing him or her respect, but I am capable of recognizing 
the unique personal lovableness of only a very few persons 
and I am capable of loving only these few. There is, strange 
to say, a certain communicability that remains in the dignity 
of the person, even though it is grounded precisely in the 
incommunicable selfhood of each person.60
 The interesting idea contained in this text is that there is a distinction 
between the fact of incommunicability and the very content of some specific 
person’s uniqueness.61 Every person is unique, thus uniqueness is a common 
trait, yet the very inner, essential and unrepeatable content of a person’s 
uniqueness is not found in any other. It is that very inner uniqueness of a 
specific person for which there are no words; it is that which once glimpsed 
inspires love and is then seen even more clearly because of the love. Yet 
this unique, unrepeatable lovableness of someone whom you love cannot be 
asserted in words, no matter how clearly your love lets you see it.62
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CONCLUSION: AN APPLICATION TO HEALTH-CARE AND 
BIO-ETHICS
 It may be possible here to make a modest step in responding to the 
call of Karol Wojtyła to recapitulate the metaphysical sense and mystery of 
the fundamental uniqueness of each human person as the only response to the 
“disintegration planned at times by atheistic ideologies.” Crosby claims that 
when we awaken to the uniqueness of a person whom we love and thereby 
become aware of the mysterious concreteness of human persons, our value 
consciousness becomes immeasurably enlarged.63
One famous atheist who, as shown above, currently plans out the 
pulverization of the fundamental uniqueness of each person is Professor Peter 
Singer of Princeton University. In a recent article64 I discussed the reasons 
for Singer’s decision to hire a team of home health care professionals for his 
mother who at the time was suffering from severe dementia.65 According to 
the theories that Singer has long espoused, Singer ought to have either let his 
mother die or have killed her. I pointed out that it was precisely when Singer 
got into the position of dealing with the suffering of a person whom he loved 
dearly that he reversed in his actions what he has insisted on for decades in 
his books. Many critics of Singer demanded an explanation for his behavior. 
Ultimately, he claimed that he committed a morally wrong act by caring for 
his mother.66 But this answer, I pointed out, does not express the motive for his 
action, it only provides an excuse: moral weakness – if he had been stronger he 
would, it seems, have killed her. But there must have been a positive reason/
motive for his actions. I suggested that he did not kill his mother because he 
loved her and that his love made him see the reasons within her being for 
which she should not have been killed. I found in Singer’s own words the 
basis of my assertion, when he said to Michael Specter (who pressed him 
on the point), “I think this has made me see how the issues of someone with 
these kinds of problems are really very difficult…. Perhaps it is more difficult 
than I thought before, because it is different when it’s your mother.”67 In other 
words, the difference when it is your mother is that you love her, and this 
expands your awareness of the worth of the person exponentially because in 
love you become aware of precisely the ineffable, unrepeatable preciousness 
of that person. In uttering these words Singer revealed that he had exactly this 
awareness in the case of his mother, and that this is the reason he behaved so 
differently in that case: his value knowledge expanded to large proportions 
in the case of his mother through his love of her. While it caused Singer to 
behave towards his own mother in a way that John Paul II would approve of, 
and while it perplexed him enough to make this admission to Michael Specter, 
it did not cause him to undergo a great awakening to the incommunicable 
selfhood and mysterious concreteness of every person.68
Jonathan Sanford concludes his important study of Scheler’s idea of 
cognition through feelings with the following point:
Scheler’s sensitivity to the emotional sphere of the human 
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being leads him to explore facets of our contact with the 
world that philosophers have but rarely considered. One 
reason that philosophers have shied away from discussing 
the emotional sphere, and our intuitive experience of the 
world, is that intuitive evidence cannot be demonstratively 
verified…Some things are simply given…the inability to 
prove evidence gleaned through intuition is no reason to 
reject that evidence. If in fact reflection on our experience 
of reality suggests that affective insights do occur, then we 
ought to theorize about the nature of such insights…and 
examine their content.69
Singer perceived this in the case of his mother and acted in a manner 
that follows from such awareness in her case, but he could not extend that 
awareness to other persons whom he does not love. Peter Berkowitz, upon 
hearing about Singer’s behavior towards his mother, wrote an excellent piece 
whose title aptly gets this point across: “Other People’s Mothers.”70
There is a raging debate in contemporary ethics which centers around 
the conflict between the intuition that killing innocents is wrong and the 
inability to demonstrably justify that intuition.71 Many utilitarians are conflicted 
within themselves because of this paradox. For example, J.J.C. Smart, after 
drawing the conclusion that it is ethically right to kill an innocent person 
when that action results in the avoidance of large scale suffering, asserted, 
“Even in my most utilitarian moods I am not happy about this consequence 
of utilitarianism.”72 Smart attempts but ultimately fails to find a satisfactory 
solution to his dilemma,73 because he rejects evidence that is obtained through 
intuition simply because it is so obtained. Another way to put this would be 
to say that he decides to hold the view that he does not know any dimension 
of reality that cannot be expressed in formulaic assertions, even if he knows 
that he knows such a dimension of reality (which I think his unhappiness 
proves).
 Scheler and Wojtyła have an answer to this problem. Scheler describes 
the position manifested by thinkers like Smart as a philosophical prejudice.
Until recent times philosophy was inclined to a prejudice 
that has its historical origin in antiquity. This prejudice 
consists in upholding the division between “reason” and 
“sensibility,” which is completely inadequate in terms of 
the structure of the spiritual. This division demands that we 
assign everything that is not rational – that is not order, law, 
and the like – to sensibility. Thus our whole emotional life 
– and, for most modern philosophers, our conative life as 
well, even love and hate – must be assigned to “sensibility.” 
According to this division, everything, in the mind which is 
alogical, e.g., intuition, feeling, striving, loving, hating, is 
dependent on man’s psychophysical organization.74
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Samuel Scheffler represents this way of thinking exactly as Scheler 
diagnosed it. We can see this in Scheffler’s thought experiment concerning 
what he calls the “Infallible Optimizer.”
Suppose that there was a machine, the Infallible Optimizer, 
which never made mistakes in its judgments about which 
of the actions available to an agent at a time would actually 
minimize total deaths overall. Suppose further that people 
were causally incapable of killing unless the Infallible 
Optimizer certified that a killing was necessary in order to 
minimize total deaths.75
 After expressing this thought experiment, Scheffler considers how 
those who hold to absolute moral norms might feel if this situation were real, 
and concludes:
Defenders of agent-centered restrictions will presumably 
feel a residual intuition that, even in circumstances such as 
these, it would be wrong to kill a person in order to minimize 
deaths.76
 The phrase “residual intuition” in this text reveals the bizarreness 
of what I will call the “hyper-rationalism” diagnosed by Scheler. Whether 
or not Scheffler is a defender of agent-centered restrictions, let us ask him 
this: if the Infallible Optimizer, which by definition cannot be mistaken, told 
him that of the actions available to him to torture one of his own loved ones 
would actually minimize total deaths overall, would his feeling concerning 
the possible wrongness of this act be, as he claims it would, nothing more 
than a mere “residual intuition”? Scheffler is the one who asked us to enter 
this thought experiment, so I am in his thought experiment now; does it obtain 
as he said it would? How would he reply? He might answer with a remark he 
makes a little later,
…it is only too easy to think of a psychological explanation 
for the commitment to agent-centered restrictions, an 
explanation that would provide a motivation of a kind for 
the restrictions, but not a motivation that would make them 
seem especially well-founded morally.77
 In this response, a “psychological explanation” is put forward as an 
irrational one; but let us ask Scheffler why he would want to reduce his love for 
his own loved one to psychological nonsense. Perhaps it is because he adheres 
to the philosophical prejudice mentioned by Scheler that “everything…in the 
mind which is alogical, e.g., intuition, feeling, striving, loving, hating, is 
dependent on man’s psychophysical organization.” Why not grant that love 
is a genuine source of knowledge, especially if you know that it is? Why not 
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grant that it is only in a philosophy book that one can deny this knowledge, 
but not in real life? Why not ask whether it is philosophical prejudice that 
explains why one would be committed in a philosophy book to a position that 
one finds ridiculous in real life? Why not grant that love is not psychological 
nonsense, but rather the source of our knowledge of the unique, unrepeatable 
inner being of the people we know and love?78
Scheffler is convinced that "[i]n the case of agent-centered 
restrictions…we have only surface intuitions; no underlying general rationale 
has as yet been identified.”79 The reason why no “general” rationale has 
been identified is because persons are not general, they are individual, and 
their individuality is ineffable. Scheffler ponders further and says that even 
if no such general rationale exists, “many people would doubtless feel that 
the intuitions to which the restrictions respond are nevertheless so central 
that they cannot in the end be rejected, problematic though they may be.”80 
While his awareness of the centrality of these intuitions goes in the right 
direction, I still find this series of thoughts stunning. Only a hyper-rationalist 
would apply the term “problematic” to one of the deepest dimensions of love. 
Again, if the Infallible Optimizer discovered that hundreds of people would 
be saved if Scheffler tortured one of his own loved ones, does he mean to 
assert that he would find it merely “problematic” and this problem, namely, 
his “psychological” love for his loved one, would most likely leave him some 
“residual moral intuitions?”
 Ultimately Scheffler concludes that no underlying reasons have as yet 
been found for agent-centered restrictions,81 and he expresses his worry that 
“unless it is possible to identify an underlying rationale for the restrictions, I 
do think that those who accept them have serious cause for concern.”82 I agree 
that those who accept absolute moral norms have serious cause for concern, 
but not about the norms themselves; allow me to explain. Towards the end 
of his well-known essay defending utilitarianism, J.J.C. Smart makes the 
following unexpected remark:
One must not think of the utilitarian as the sort of person 
who you would not trust further than you could kick him. As 
a matter of untutored sociological observation…the sort of 
people who might do you down are rarely utilitarians.83
 He makes this remark in the context of expressing his unhappiness 
that the utilitarian “must admit…that he might find himself in circumstances 
where he ought to be unjust.”84 And in the next sentence, revealing again that 
he would rather act in accord with his intuitions, he says, “Let us hope that 
this is a logical possibility not a factual one.”
I submit that Scheffler has misdiagnosed the worry of those who hold 
to absolute moral norms. They have to worry not about the norms, but about 
the very hyper-rationalist outlook held by Scheffler and others. Singer thinks 
the debate is over, and once quipped that it is high time to realize that there 
is a good deal to be inferred from the inability to defend these intuitions.85 
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Why has Peter Singer risen to fame? There are many reasons, but surely one 
of them is that, unlike Smart, he has no qualms about taking this logic of 
utilitarianism into reality; of the many examples, one could think perhaps of 
his endorsement of infanticide.
For those utilitarians or hyper-rationalists who have concerns about 
the moral conclusions of their more bold like-minded colleagues, Scheler 
and Wojtyła have a suggestion. Scheler, I think, would ask them to ponder 
his assertion that “A spirit limited to perception and thinking would be 
absolutely blind to values, no matter how much it might have the faculty of 
‘inner perception.’”86 And Wojtyła would then encourage them to find a way 
to bring across “the metaphysical sense and mystery of the person.”87 This 
task is challenging and he grants that it is “difficult to formulate a systematic 
theory on how to relate to people,”88 since “[e]very human being is an individual 
person and therefore I cannot program a priori a certain type of relationship 
that could be applied to everyone.”89 But he also says, “I was greatly helped 
in this by the study of personalism during the years I devoted to philosophy.”90 
We know that he primarily studied Scheler during those years, and we see 
here that he chose the Schelerian formulation “individual person,” and so we 
may perceive a call, perhaps, to turn to Scheler for help to go beyond “sterile 
polemics” to a “recapitulation of the inviolable mystery of the person.”91,92
APPENDIX
Below you will find a series of quotes by Wojtyła in which he 
expresses his indebtedness to Max Scheler. Above each quote, in italics, I 
have tried to formulate the exact senses in which each quote represents an 
indebtedness to Scheler. Some of the examples show this through unique ways 
of citing Scheler (e.g., naming a section of a book specifically according to 
Scheler’s book title, and citing Scheler’s name first in lists of philosophers to 
whom he is indebted). The other examples reveal a wide range of Schelerian 
philosophical content from which Wojtyła drew: self-donation, ressentiment, 
shame, suffering, the genius of woman, moral becoming, and a connection to 
the meaning of family.
This appendix represents only the tip of the iceberg. The depth with 
which Wojtyła absorbed Scheler could be revealed by a thorough cataloguing 
of the actual citations of Scheler by Wojtyła, a language analysis to show that 
he speaks on very many occasions exactly as Scheler spoke (see the 'genius 
of woman' entry below), and, of course, a deepening of awareness of the 
philosophical content in Scheler which informs Wojtyła’s work.
1. Prominence Given to Scheler
Theme:
a. Wojtyła often either names Scheler alone or in a list of philosophers 
places Scheler’s name first when he cites his contemporary sources. 
Here is another example of the prominence he gives to Scheler’s 
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name, above all the other contemporary thinkers he mentions, as 
important for his understanding of anthropology, moral philosophy, 
and redemption.
The whole argument developed thus far concerning the 
theory of good and evil belongs to moral philosophy. I 
devoted some years of work to these problems at the Catholic 
University of Lublin. I put together my ideas on the subject 
firstly in the book Love and Responsibility, then in The Acting 
Person, and finally in the Wednesday catecheses which were 
published under the title Original Unity of Man and Woman. 
On the basis of further reading and research undertaken 
during the ethics seminar at Lublin, I came to see how 
important these problems were for a number of contemporary 
thinkers: Max Scheler and other phenomenologists, Jean-
Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas and Paul Ricoeur, and also 
Vladimir Soloviev, not to mention Fyodor Dostoyevsky. 
Through these analyses of anthropological reality, various 
manifestations emerge of man’s desire for Redemption, and 
confirmation is given of the need for a Redeemer if man is 
to attain salvation.93
2. The Concept of Self-Donation
Theme:
a.  Wojtyła commentators say that Gaudium et Spes 24,3 is the core text 
out of which he developed his idea of self-donation; in the text below 
John Paul II credits Max Scheler with holding a view similar to his 
own that self-gift is the antidote to a type of self-centered freedom.
Here we truly have an adequate interpretation of the 
commandment of love. Above all, the principle that a person 
has a value by the simple fact that he is a person finds very 
clear expression: man, it is said, “is the only creature on 
earth that God has wanted for his own sake.” At the same 
time the Council emphasizes that the most important thing 
about love is the sincere gift of self. In this sense the person 
is realized through love.
Therefore, these two aspects – the affirmation of the 
person as a person and the sincere gift of self – not only do 
not exclude each other, they mutually confirm and complete 
each other. Man affirms himself most completely by giving of 
himself. This is the fulfillment of the commandment of love. 
This is also the full truth about man, a truth that Christ taught 
us by His life, and that the tradition of Christian morality, 
no less than the tradition of saints and of the many heroes 
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of love of neighbor, took up and lived out in the course of 
history.
If we deprive human freedom of this possibility, if man 
does not commit himself to becoming a gift for others, then 
this freedom can become dangerous. It will become freedom 
to do what I myself consider as a good, what brings me profit 
or pleasure, even a sublimated pleasure. If we cannot accept 
the prospect of giving ourselves as a gift, then the danger of 
a selfish freedom will always be present. Kant fought against 
this danger, and along the same line so did Max Scheler 
and so many after him who shared his ethics of values. But 
a complete expression of all this is already found in the 
Gospel. For this very reason, we can find in the Gospel a 
consistent declaration of all human rights, even those that 
for various reasons can make us feel uneasy.94
3. Ressentiment as a Development Beyond Acedia
Theme:
a. Here, as a way to cite his indebtedness to Scheler, Wojtyła chooses 
the title for a subheading in Love and Responsibility because of 
Scheler’s work.
b. Wojtyła also credits Scheler with the achievement of diagnosing an 
ailment of modern man with which Saint Thomas Aquinas was not 
familiar; Scheler’s ressentiment represents, according to Wojtyła, a 
philosophical development beyond St. Thomas’ notion of acedia.
The title of this paragraph is borrowed from Max Scheler, 
who published a study called The Rehabilitation of Virtue…
Scheler saw a need for the rehabilitation of virtue because 
he discerned in modern man a characteristic spiritual 
attitude which is inimical to sincere respect for it. He has 
called this attitude ‘resentment.’ Resentment arises from 
an erroneous and distorted sense of values. It is a lack of 
objectivity in judgment and evaluation, and it has its origin 
in weakness of will. The fact is that attaining or realizing a 
higher value demands a greater effort of will. So in order 
to spare ourselves the effort, to excuse our failure to obtain 
this value, we minimize its significance, deny it the respect 
which it deserves, even see it as in some way evil, although 
objectivity requires us to recognize that it is good. Resentment 
possesses as you see the distinctive characteristics of the 
cardinal sin called sloth. St. Thomas defines sloth (acedia) 
as “a sadness arising from the fact that the good is difficult.” 
This sadness, far from denying the good, indirectly helps to 
keep respect for it alive in the soul. Resentment, however, 
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does not stop at this: it not only distorts the features of the 
good but devalues that which rightly deserves respect, so 
that man need not struggle to raise himself to the level of the 
true good, but can “light-heartedly” recognize as good only 
what suits him, what is convenient and comfortable for him. 
Resentment is a feature of the subjective mentality: pleasure 
takes the place of superior values.95
4. The Concept of Shame
Theme:
a. I wrote my philosophy master’s thesis on the concept of shame in the 
thought of Scheler/Hildebrand/ Wojtyła,6 and there I showed numerous 
ways that Wojtyła was impressed by and indebted to Scheler’s essay on 
shame. Wojtyła opens the chapter in Love and Responsibility titled, “The 
Metaphysics of Shame” citing his sources, and Scheler’s name appears 
first:
The phenomenon of shame, and of sexual shame in particular, 
has attracted the attention of the phenomenologists (M. 
Scheler, F. Sawicki). It is a theme which opens up a broad 
field of observation and which lends itself to analysis in 
depth.98
5. The Meaning of Suffering as Unleashing Love
Theme:
a. In this letter, John Paul II uses the Schelerian idea that suffering 
exists in order to unleash love. He does not cite Scheler, but the 
language and ideas of the text reveal that he draws on him.
b. I have shown the similarity between Pope John Paul II and Scheler on 
the idea of the interior unleashing of love as the reason for suffering 
in, Peter J. Colosi, “John Paul II and Christian Personalism vs. Peter 
Singer and Utilitarianism: Two Radically Opposed Conceptions 
of the Nature and Meaning of Suffering.” rd Global Conference: 
Making Sense of: Health, Illness and Disease July  - July , 2004 St 
Catherine’s College, Oxford University. The full paper can be found 
at: http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/mso/hid/hid/Colosi%20paper.
pdf
“Suffering is…present in order to unleash love.”100
6. The Genius of Woman
Theme:
a. The core idea in John Paul II’s development of the genius of woman is 
The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyła              8
present in Scheler. Notice by comparing the texts below, that John Paul II 
speaks with the same language as Scheler.
Scheler: …women…possess powers of intuition, which 
being based on the maternal instinct with its specialized 
aptitudes for identification, are found only rudimentarily in 
man…This capacity first develops, no doubt, in a woman’s 
own experience of maternity, but it is not confined to her 
own child, or to children generally, for it extends, when fully 
developed, to all the world.101
John Paul II: “Motherhood involves a special 
communion with the mystery of life, as it develops in the 
woman’s womb. The mother is filled with wonder at this 
mystery of life, and “understands” with unique intuition 
what is happening inside her. In the light of the “beginning”, 
the mother accepts and loves as a person the child she is 
carrying in her womb. This unique contact with the new 
human being developing within her gives rise to an attitude 
towards human beings - not only towards her own child, but 
every human being - which profoundly marks the woman’s 
personality. It is commonly thought that women are more 
capable than men of paying attention to another person, and 
that motherhood develops this predisposition even more. 
The man - even with all his sharing in parenthood - always 
remains “outside” the process of pregnancy and the baby’s 
birth; in many ways he has to learn his own “fatherhood” 
from the mother.”102
7. On the Relation Between Acting and Becoming
Theme: 
a. The relation between personal acting and becoming a certain kind of 
person is a prominent theme of The Acting Person. Below are two quotes, 
one from Scheler the other from Wojtyła, which give evidence of the 
“Schelerian foundation” of The Acting Person. 
Scheler: There is no act whose execution does not change 
the content of the person’s being, and no act-value that does 
not increase or decrease, enhance or diminish, or positively 
or negatively determine the value of the person. In every 
moral individual act of positive value the ability for acts of 
the kind increase; in other words, there is an increase in what 
we designated as the virtue of the person…. Thus mediated, 
every moral act effects changes in the being and value of the 
person himself.103 
Wojtyła: It is in man’s actions, his conscious acting, 
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that make of him what and who he actually is. This form 
of the human becoming thus presupposes the efficacy or 
causation proper to man…It is man’s actions, the way he 
consciously acts, that make of him a good or a bad man – 
good or bad in the moral sense. To be “morally good” means 
to be good as a man. To be “morally bad” means to be bad 
as a man. Whether a man, because of his actions, becomes 
morally better or morally worse depends on the nature 
and modalities of actions. The qualitative moments and 
virtualities of actions, inasmuch as they refer to the moral 
norm and ultimately to the dictates of the conscience, are 
imprinted upon man by his performing the actions.
The becoming of man in his moral aspect that is 
strictly connected with the person is the decisive factor in 
determining the concrete realistic character of goodness and 
badness, of the moral values themselves as concretized in 
human acting…Man not only concretizes them in action and 
experiences them but because of them he himself, as a being, 
actually becomes good or bad. Moral conduct partakes of the 
reality of human actions as expressing a specific type and 
line of becoming of the man-subject, the type of becoming 
that is most intrinsically related to his nature, that is, his 
humanness, and to the fact of his being a person.104
8. Family
 
In  one  of  the  preparatory  regional  conferences (Geneva, Switzerland) 
leading up to The Doha International Conference for the Family,105 I presented 
a paper in which I explored some of the Papal pronouncements of John Paul 
II on the family in an attempt to show their connections to the uniqueness of 
individual persons and love. For example, I said that John Paul’s statement 
that, “The “sovereignty” of the family is essential for the good of society,”106 
can be explained in this way: “The family is the deepest source of achieving 
that grand goal of “a better world” because of its intimate inner side where 
the depth and preciousness of the family members are revealed to each other. 
That inspires a depth of love scarcely possible outside of this setting, which 
at the same time is able to serve as a rich inner resource in going out to help 
those outside of the inner family circle.”107 And this interpretation is perhaps 
confirmed by the Pope when he says, “If the family is so important for the 
civilization of love, it is because of the particular closeness and intensity 
of the bonds which come to be between persons and generations within the 
family.”108
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Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyła /Pope John Paul II”.
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Scheler a master from whom he learned much and whose influence on his 
thought was deep and lasting.
7 Scheler, held this view too: “[o]nly persons can (originally) be 
morally good or evil; everything else can be good or evil only by reference 
to persons, no matter how indirect this ‘reference’ [Hinsehen] may be.” Max 
Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values, translated by 
Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1973a), 85.
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8 Consider  Peter Jackson’s recent remake of the movie King Kong, in 
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to the “actualism” which rules the day in many euthanasia debates, whereby 
it is asserted that humans with diminished consciousness no longer possess 
within them any quality that makes a moral claim on others not to kill them.
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not be used merely as a means, and hence so far limits all choice (and is an 
object of respect)…If, then, there is to be a supreme practical principle…The 
ground of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself.” Immanuel 
Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, translated and edited by 
Mary J. Gregor, in Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 78-80.
11 Crosby cites: Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common 
Good (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1947), ch. 3.
12 Crosby cites: Emmanuel Mounier, Personalism (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 2001), 17-19.
13 Crosby cites: Hans Urs von Bathasar, “On the Concept of Person,” 
Communio 13, (Spring, 1986), 18.
14 John F.   Crosby, Personalist Papers (Washington, D.C.: The 
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proceed I will draw on this body of secondary literature. John F. Crosby has 
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F. Crosby, The Selfhood of the Human Person (Washington DC: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1996), chapter 2, titled, “Incommunicability,” 
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Persons: Revisiting Peter Singer and his Critics,” Journal of Interdisciplinary 
Studies, 2003, Vol. XV (1/2): 3-22. 
16 A section of a personal letter from Wojtyła to Henri           de Lubac, 
cited in de Lubac, Henri, At the Service of the Church. Henri de Lubac 
Reflects on the Circumstances that Occasioned His Writings, translated by 
Anne Elizabeth Englund (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), 171-72.
17 See Max   Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy, translated by Peter 
Heath. Hamden, (Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, 1973b), 122. There 
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a certain hypothesis, and “as such knowledge increases, so the content of 
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(individuum est ineffabile).”
18 See  Crosby, 1996, 41-42.
19 Scheler, 1973a, 489.
20 See  Crosby, 1996, 41 and 54-58.
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the uniqueness in each other. He has also shown that if such knowledge and 
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See Crosby, 1996, 54-58.
22 See Jonathan J.    Sanford, “Affective Insight: Scheler on Feeling 
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(Vol. 76, 2002), 167-72.
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24 In his work    Ethics (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1953), 
chapter 17 (titled: “Value Response”), Dietrich von Hildebrand has with 
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persons, with the various faculties of the soul, perform acts of cognition and 
when, with those same faculties, they perform responses to that which they 
have cognized.
25 Miller, 167.
26 George  Weigel, “Mourning and Remembrance,” Wall Street 
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27 Crosby, 1996, 72.
28 Crosby, 2004, 151.
29 Scheler, (1973b), 166.
30 Weigel rightly represents common features of human persons that 
John Paul held up as the source of our worth, but again in a way that overlooks 
the aspect of uniqueness, when he says, “John Paul II has insisted for a quarter-
century that human rights are the moral core of the ‘universal common good’ 
…all thinking about society, even international society, must begin with an 
adequate philosophical anthropology of the person, which recognizes in the 
human quest for transcendent truth and love the defining characteristic of our 
humanity.” [italics original] George Weigel, “Moral Leadership and World 
Politics in the 21st Century, Thomas Merton Lecture, Columbia University, 
Oct. 30, 2003.
31 In my response to this objection I rely on many of the insights              
in Crosby, 1996, chapter 2. A different Thomistic-based critique of the idea 
of personal uniqueness can be found in Stephen L. Brock, “Is Uniqueness 
at the Root of Personal Dignity? John Crosby and Thomas Aquinas,” in The 
Thomist 69 (2005), 173-201. I have debated Brock on this very question, but 
it would go outside the bounds of this paper to deal with his article here.
32 W. Norris   Clark, S.J., from his Introduction to: James F. Anderson, 
An Introduction to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: 
Regnery Publishing, Inc., 1997), xv.
33 According to   Aristotle’s principle of identity which states that 
“each thing is itself and not another.”
34 See  Crosby, 1996, 44-45. In his book Sein und Wesen, (Heidelberg: 
Universitaetsverlag C. Winter, 1996), Josef Seifert has sharply distinguished 
many senses of essence and existence, including the one I just mentioned 
between the general plan and the real concrete essence present in one of its 
instantiations, to which I am indebted for enabling me to make this point. 
An earlier English version of Seifert’s work is his “Essence and Existence.” 
Aletheia, 1977/78, Vol. 1.1 and 1.2. (Crosby also credits Seifert for clarifying 
these points to him. See Crosby, 1996, 43, n. 3).
35 It should be noted that an incidental scratch or imperfection on            
one chair would not justify a metaphysical claim to any profound essential 
uniqueness.
36 I put the word “worth” in parentheses because “worth” seems too            
lofty a title for the value of a chair.
37 For the following insight I am relying on         Crosby, 1996, 50 ff.
38 That would also lead to the odd state of affairs of you having to               
say to the people whom you love: “I just want you to know how lucky you are 
right now because I am here, otherwise, you’d be worthless!”
39 Unfortunately for my purposes, Wojtyła makes just such a remark           
at Karol Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility (New York: Farrer, Strauss, Giroux, 
1981), 24. It goes without saying that I disagree with his assertion there, but 
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I also think that it is flatly contradicted by other pastoral and theological texts 
of his that I analyze in this paper.
40 See  Scheler, 1973b, 123, where he explains his idea that, “The 
spiritual substances inherent in persons or their acts are thus the only substances 
having a truly individual essence…”
41 See  Seifert, 1997, 101.
42 John Paul II, Rise, Let Us Be On Our Way (New York: Warner 
Books, 2004), 65-66.
43 Scheler, 1973b, 166: “The love which has moral value is not that 
which pays loving regard to a person for having such and such qualities, 
pursuing such and such activities, or for possessing talents, beauty, or virtue; 
it is that love which incorporates these qualities, activities and gifts into its 
object, because they belong to that individual person.”
44 I had a personal     experience of his absorption of this insight. I was 
able to attend close to twenty Wednesday audiences and quite a few Holy 
Week Masses in Rome with Pope John Paul II, always with thousands of other 
people. I never had the opportunity to speak with him or to shake his hand. 
However, once I was leaning over a railing looking away from him as he was 
recessing at the end of Mass in St. Peter’s Basilica. Hundreds of people were 
present, but I was right on the aisle. I turned around, and to my surprise, he 
had been staring at the back of my head waiting for me to turn around. He 
looked at me, into my eyes and kept looking. It was quite moving, and the 
quotes I have given are true to his life - in that look I felt like he was saying, 
“who are you? I want to meet you.” I felt my uniqueness in that moment, me, 
being approached in love, just as it says in that quote; I felt in that look that he 
felt that he was encountering something utterly unique when he was meeting 
me – that he never met before and never would meet again (unless he met me 
again, which he did not).
It was a beautiful experience, and if I may indulge in one further 
reflection on it, I would say that what strikes me as philosophically highly 
interesting here is a similarity between John Paul II and Blessed Mother 
Teresa. We feel loved in our uniqueness more in the family than anywhere 
else, and being loved like that by parents is the source of many good things. 
And we are enabled, within the setting of the family, to love our siblings in this 
way too; next comes our relatives and dearest friends. But what a challenge 
it is to attempt to approach everyone like that. I believe, and I think my very 
brief encounter with the man (and its very brevity reinforces the point), that 
Pope John II wrote the text I quoted above out of his constant effort to never 
forget this truth as he continually met people. How exhausting it would be for 
me to be continually in the mode of remembering that each person I meet is 
unique and unrepeatable and that this is the most important dimension of this 
person and the one I need to be aware of in order to respect them in the way 
they truly deserve. It seems to me that John Paul II and Blessed Mother Teresa 
spent their lives trying to do exactly this. And there is plenty of evidence that 
Wojtyła learned this dimension of personal uniqueness from Max Scheler.
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45 Pope John Paul II, Gift and Mystery (New York: Image Books, 
1999), 93-94.
46 John Paul II, First Christmas radio message: AAS 71 (1979b), 
66.
47 Of course, that individual is also given in that moment a human             
nature, but this is not the significance of the quote.
48 Scheler, 1973b, 34.
49 As Josef   Seifert once observed in a conversation, this truism is not 
strictly accurate; if one looks closely at the faces of identical twins one sees 
that they are, in fact, not identical. Nonetheless, Crosby’s point about the non-
absurdity of the duplication of such traits remains intact, despite its statistical 
improbability.
50 Crosby, 1996, 64-65.
51 Miller, 163-81.
52 Miller, 2005, 164.
53 Pope  John Paul II, The Gospel of Life (New York: Random House, 
1995), para. 44.
54 Wojtyła, 1995, para., 61.    
55 Crosby, 2004, 149.
56 See  Crosby,  2004, 150, n. 15.
57 Although it seems to me from       Scheler’s notion of the divinely 
determined dimension of the individual value essence that this is a correct 
assertion, some other texts of Scheler are open to debate about whether or not he 
rejects the personhood of the embryo. The strongest of the texts in favor of the 
view that Scheler does reject the personhood of embryos are at 1973a, 476-78. 
Others can be found at 1973a, 313-15. However, it seems to me that on pages 
313-15 and 476 Scheler is not making a point about the ontological status of 
the embryo as a non-person, but rather on the inability of us to perceive signs 
of its personhood. (I wonder if he would have been as moved as Tony Blair 
was by the new three-dimensional, color video clips of early fetuses 'walking', 
crying and smiling in the womb?) Manfred Frings does not, it seems to me, 
take the time to distinguish clearly these two questions (i.e., whether it is our 
inability to perceive signs of personhood or actual ontological non-personhood 
that is the reason for the killing/murder distinction discussed by Scheler), and 
Frings concludes too quickly in the ontological direction. See Manfred S. 
Frings, The Mind of Max Scheler, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 
1997), 48-49. And while John Paul II in The Gospel of Life, para. 60 is arguing 
for the personhood of the embryo, he nonetheless begins by granting a certain 
empirical difficulty when he says, “Even if the presence of a spiritual soul 
cannot be ascertained by empirical data, the results themselves of scientific 
research on the human embryo provide a valuable indication for discerning by 
the use of reason a personal presence at the moment of the first appearance of 
a human life: how could a human individual not be a human person?” I grant 
that what Scheler says on 1973a, 478 sounds like a clear ontological statement 
taking full personhood away from younger children, “Only a child who has 
‘come of age’ is a person in the full sense…The basic phenomenon of coming 
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of age consists in the ability to experience insight into the difference between 
one’s own and someone else’s acts, willing, feeling, thinking…”. However, I 
also think that further work along the lines of the textual analysis of Sanford, 
2005, and further study about the exact sense in which the individual value 
essence is determined by the Divine Being could lead to a contradiction of 
Scheler against Scheler on this point. Whatever the final verdict is on Scheler’s 
position concerning the personhood of minimally or non-conscious humans 
– which is by no means decided as of yet – Philip Blosser has rightly stated 
that all of the thinkers after Scheler who belong to his school are clear that 
the being of persons is not reducible to their conscious awakeness, “Yet while 
defending the irreducible subjectivity of persons, Crosby, Josef Seifert, and 
others like them in the realistic phenomenological tradition of Dietrich von 
Hildebrand, Karol Wojtyła and Edith Stein, insist no less on distinguishing 
‘being’ from ‘subjectivity.’ While recognizing that personal being actualizes 
itself in subjectivity, they deny it exhausts itself in subjectivity. Thus, they 
typically maintain that a metaphysics of substance is capable of a personalist, 
phenomenological articulation.” Philip Blosser, “Scheler’s Concept of the 
Person Against Its Kantian Background.” In Max Scheler’s Acting Persons, 
New Perspective, edited by Stephen Schneck (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), 
59. For examples of this see, Seifert, 1997, chapters 3 and 4, and Crosby, 
2004, chapter 6, titled, “Person and Consciousness.”
58 Crosby, 1996, 59-65.
59 Crosby, 1996, 68.
60 Crosby, 1996, 67.
61 See also   Crosby, 2004, 19-20 (points 2 and 3) for his response to 
objections which tend to conflate the mere fact of being unique with the very 
inner uniqueness of a specific person.
62 Crosby continues: “The principle of incommunicability asserts 
itself more strongly, so to say, in the unrepeatable lovableness of a person. This 
is why we lack any general terms to express the lovableness of a particular 
person; we keenly experience here the ineffability, the unutterability of the 
incommunicable. But our language and concepts do not fail us in the same 
way when it comes to the dignity of the person; after all ‘the dignity of the 
person’ is a general term. It is as if I recognize a human being as person as 
when I am mindful of his dignity and show him respect and abstain from all 
coercion and using, but recognize a human being as this particular person 
when I know him or her as friend or spouse.” 1996, 67.
63 Crosby, 1996, 66.
64 Peter J. Colosi, “What’s Love Got to Do with It: The Ethical 
Contradictions of Peter Singer.” (February 25, 2005), www.godspy.com, and 
reprinted at www.catholiceducation.org.
65 This situation was described in a profile piece on          Singer by Michael 
Specter entitled, “The Dangerous Philosopher,” on September 6, 1999 in The 
New Yorker, 46-55.
66 Here are his words, in full: “Suppose, however, that it were crystal             
clear that the money could do more good elsewhere. Then I would be doing 
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wrong in spending it on my mother, just as I do wrong when I spend, on myself 
or my family, money that could do more good if donated to an organization 
that helps people in much greater need than we are. I freely admit to not doing 
all that I should; but I could do it, and the fact that I do not do it does not vitiate 
the claim that it is what I should do.” Peter Singer, “Outsiders: our obligations 
to those beyond our borders,” in The Ethics of Assistance, ed. Deen Chatterjee 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 29. One must also add that 
this text is sophistical. Selecting concepts such as “spending money on my 
mother,” “spending money on myself,” and “doing more good,” while leaving 
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68 See  Crosby, 2004, 23-24 for an expression of how this extension 
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